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“We Are The World” — Or Are We?
The United States’ Conflicting Views on the Use of International Law 
and Foreign Legal Decisions
by  Hadar  Harr i s
I
N A COUNTRY IDEOLOGICALLY DIVIDED into what the world has
come to know as “red states” and “blue states,” another kind of
ideological divide is underway. This time, however, the divide
splits the three major branches of government in the United
States. The emerging controversy surrounds the place of international
and foreign law in U.S. judicial interpretation and decision-making. 
The legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the U.S.
government each have specific roles when it comes to law-making
and interpretation. The legislative branch drafts laws, the executive
branch implements and enforces them, and the courts interpret
them in the case of conflict. Each branch is independent and serves
to balance the others. Thus, the emerging struggle over the place
of international and foreign law not only underscores a deep ideo-
logical debate, but it also cuts to the core of the separation of pow-
ers and the traditional role that each branch of government has
historically played. In this system of checks and balances, it is
unclear who is checking and who is balancing.
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States
(Court) has increasingly cited international and foreign law. This
trend has emerged without fanfare and with little explanation. In
addition to the recent juvenile death penalty case of Roper v.
Simmons, the Court has used international standards and compar-
ative case law in cases as varied as those focused on the legality of
homosexual sodomy (Lawrence v. Texas), the expropriation of art-
work in war time (Republic of Austria v. Altmann), and the use of
affirmative action in law school admissions (Grutter v. Bollinger). 
Ironically, such decisions come against the backdrop of an
executive branch that has repeatedly shown disdain for the inter-
national legal regime. It has reinforced its unilateralist world view
by withdrawing from treaties, selectively ratifying international
agreements, and narrowly (and sometimes mistakenly) re-
interpreting existing obligations and well-settled principles of
international law. Nowhere was this more clearly and publicly
exemplified than in the now-infamous “Torture Memos” which
argued that the “War on Terror,” including the treatment of
detainees, should be exempt from the constraints of the Geneva
Convention. 
The tension between the Supreme Court’s efforts to look out-
ward and the executive branch’s restrictive interpretations have
resulted in a clash of perspectives now playing itself out in the U.S.
Congress. Members of Congress have recently introduced two trou-
bling pieces of legislation that seek to limit judicial interpretation
and the use of foreign law in U.S. courts. This article will review
recent conflicting trends among the judicial, executive, and legisla-
tive branches of the U.S. government regarding the use of interna-
tional and foreign law in American jurisprudence and policy. 
CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SUPREME COURT
ON MARCH 1, 2005, THE HUMAN and civil rights community in the
United States won a long-awaited victory when the Supreme Court
overturned the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons with a five-
four decision. The Court cited to both international and foreign law
in its decision, making it the latest in a welcome string of cases in
which the Court has recognized the relevance and importance of for-
eign and international law. The use of international and foreign law,
however, has become a point of deep contention among the Justices.
In each case in which the majority has referred to foreign sources, the
minority has written withering dissents disavowing the use of com-
parative cases or international principles. The latest decision in
Simmons is no different.
ROPER V. SIMMONS: THE LATEST FLASHPOINT OF
CONTROVERSY FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The use of international standards and foreign law to help
articulate established principles of law has given rise to tremendous
discord in the Court, led primarily by Justices Kennedy and Breyer
on the pro-international side and Justice Scalia as the crusader
against the use of international standards and foreign law. The
Simmons decision clearly exhibited the stark contrast between the
two camps. After finding that the juvenile death penalty should be
overturned due to the emergence of a “national consensus” against
the execution of minors, Justice Kennedy went on to write in his
majority opinion that “it is proper that we acknowledge the over-
whelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be
a factor in the crime. . . . The opinion of the world community,
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and sig-
nificant confirmation for our own conclusions.” He continued, “It
does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and people simply under-
scores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom.”
Justice O’Connor further affirmed the place of foreign and
international law in the decision-making process, even as she
dissented on the majority opinion. She wrote, “[o]ver the course of
nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign
and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving stan-
dards of decency. . . . Obviously, American law is distinctive in
many respects, . . . [b]ut this Nation’s evolving understanding of
human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor in-
herently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries.” 
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia, in a scathing dissent joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, stated that “the
basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should
conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected
out of hand.” He argued that “[t]he Court should either profess its
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willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the views of
foreigners, or else it should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as
part of the reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when
it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not
reasoned decision making, but sophistry.” 
A PUBLIC DEBATE
On January 12, 2005, Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, ideological opponents on the use of foreign and
international law, held a rare public discussion about the role that
cases from foreign courts can play in U.S. constitutional interpre-
tation at American University Washington College of Law.
The Justices, conscious of their role in interpreting law rather
than inserting their own opinions into cases, vigorously debated
the place of foreign judicial decisions in U.S. constitutional
interpretation.
Justice Scalia strongly opposed the citation of foreign law in
U.S. constitutional interpretation. He argued that using foreign
law out of context provides an opportunity for justices to pick and
choose persuasive jurisprudence to promote a personal agenda
based on their own view of morality, rather than pursuing a strict
interpretation of the Constitution. He commented, “what does the
opinion of a wise Zimbabwean judge or a wise member of the
House of Lords law committee, what does that have to do with
what Americans believe, unless you really think it’s been given to
you [as a judge] to make this moral judgment, a very difficult moral
judgment? And so in making it for yourself and for the whole
country, you consult whatever authorities you want. Unless
you have that philosophy, I don’t see how [foreign law] is relevant
at all.” 
Justice Breyer, in contrast, explained that where justices are
presented with hard issues, he finds it instructive to look to the
decisions of other courts to see how they have thought about the
issues and reached their decisions. He said particularly when
dealing with issues of general principles such as “liberty” or deter-
minations of “cruel and unusual punishment,” these concepts have
similar application and understandings in many countries around
the world. To Justice Breyer, “one is not trying to figure out the
meaning, really, of the words ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ one
is trying to deal with their application. And it isn’t some arcane
matter of contract law, where a different legal system might have
given the same words totally different application . . . you’re trying
to get a picture how other people have dealt with it. And am I
influenced by that? I am at least interested in reading it. And the
fact that this has gone on all over the world and people have come
to roughly similar conclusions, in my opinion, is the reason for
thinking it at least is the kind of issue that maybe we ought to hear
in our court, because I think our people in this country are not
that much different than people other places.”
Although Justice Scalia is joined by Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist in sticking to non-international, “originalist”
views, the rest of the Court has shown an increasing interest and
concern with looking at outside opinions and international stan-
dards when deciding issues before the Court. This is not the case,
however, in the executive branch. 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH REJECTION AND
REINTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES to recognize the importance of
looking outward by referencing international standards and noting
judicial decisions from abroad, the Bush administration has consis-
tently moved away from its international legal obligations and has
reinterpreted long-standing international legal principles. The admin-
istration’s intent has been demonstrated through its withdrawal from
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 2001, reinterpretation of the
United Nations Charter to support “preemptive” war, misapplication
of the Geneva Conventions, and mistaken understanding of the legal
concept of torture outlined in the infamous “Torture Memos.”
A recent study by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy entitled, “The Treaty Database: U.S. Compliance with
Global Treaties,” shows that the Bush administration has adopted
fewer international treaties than nearly any other U.S. President in
recent history. The Bush administration has not only refrained
from signing and ratifying new agreements, but has also opted out
of previous treaty commitments. George W. Bush is the first U.S.
President ever to nullify U.S. signature of a multilateral treaty (the
Rome Statute in 2002), and he is the only major world leader to
withdraw from a nuclear treaty after it has become legally binding
(the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002). 
The latest in this string of repudiations of international law
and standards came in early March when the Bush administration
withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations. The Optional Protocol, which the
United States helped author in 1963, requires the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes over whether citizens of
countries party to the treaty have been denied the right to see
consular officials of their home country while jailed abroad, as
required by the Consular Relations treaty. The United States had
initially hailed the Optional Protocol as a means of protecting its
citizens abroad, and it brought the first case using the Protocol
when it successfully sued Iran for taking 52 American hostages in
Tehran in 1979. More recently, however, the Optional Protocol
had been used as a tool to help fight against the death penalty by
bringing cases before the ICJ asserting the rights of foreign nation-
als sentenced to death in the United States.
The decision to withdraw from the Optional Protocol came
as the United States was preparing oral arguments in the U.S.
Supreme Court on the case of Medellin v. Dretke. Medellin
involved a Mexican national sentenced to death in Texas who
6
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7appealed his conviction on the grounds that American officials
failed to notify the Mexican consulate of his arrest as required
under the Vienna Convention. Mr. Medellin argued that as a
result, he was unable to seek and obtain the assistance from his
Embassy guaranteed by the Vienna Convention, assistance that
may have prevented his conviction and subsequent death sentence. 
In 2003, the ICJ agreed with Mr. Medellin and 53 other
Mexicans sentenced to death in the United States and ruled that
the Mexican nationals should receive new hearings in Texas courts
to review their death sentences (Avena and other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America)). In the days leading up to the
March 28, 2005, arguments on domestic implementation of the
ICJ decision before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Bush adminis-
tration issued an unexpected Executive Order ordering state court
review of the detainees’ cases, per the ICJ opinion, and announced
the United States’ complete withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol.
State Department spokesperson Darla Jordan explained the
withdrawal by saying, “[t]he International Court of Justice has
interpreted the Vienna Consular Convention in ways that we had
not anticipated that involved state criminal prosecutions and the
death penalty, effectively asking the court to supervise our domes-
tic criminal system.” She went on to say that withdrawal from the
Protocol is a way of "protecting against future International Court
of Justice judgments that might similarly interpret the consular
convention or disrupt our domestic criminal system in ways we did
not anticipate when we joined the Convention." 
Although the ICJ only required that the obligations of con-
sular visits to detained foreign nationals be upheld, Ms. Jordan’s
statement clearly articulates the executive branch’s current
approach to international law—withdrawing from treaties it
deems overly critical of U.S. positions and showing disdain for
long-standing international obligations which the United States
itself helped to create.
The withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention is only one example. Bush administration officials
have repeatedly expressed their disregard for international law,
from Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez’s characterization of the
Geneva Conventions as “quaint,” to statements in the recently
released National Defense Strategy, which seem to equate legal
challenges to U.S. policies with terrorism. In a section entitled,
“Our Vulnerabilities,” the Strategy states, “[o]ur strength as a
nation-state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes
and terrorism.” 
In comments meant to explain this language, senior Defense
Department official Douglas Feith said, “[t]here are various actors
around the world that are looking to either attack or constrain the
United States, and they are going to find creative ways of doing
that that are not the obvious conventional military attacks. And
we're just pointing out that we need to think broadly about diplo-
matic lines of attack, legal lines of attack, technological lines of
attack, all kinds of asymmetric warfare that various actors can use
to try to constrain, shape our behavior. And that’s what that point
is flagging.” This explanation does not voice a great vote of confi-
dence for the use of legal mechanisms to ensure accountability and
fight impunity.
REACTION AND CONTROVERSY IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
THE SUPREME COURT, in its growing embrace of constitutional com-
parativism and the legitimization of international law, is in direct con-
flict with the executive branch’s clear discomfort with international
treaties and agreements. This tension between branches has also
focused growing attention on the place of international law and for-
eign court decisions in the legislative branch of government. 
In recent months, the U.S. Congress has begun to discuss
what role international law and foreign court opinions should play
in domestic decision-making. The decision in Roper v. Simmons
rekindled a fledgling effort started last term in favor of an intellec-
tual protectionism which would ban all “foreign opinions” from
American judicial decision-making.
In a statement released the day after the Roper v. Simmons
decision, Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) stated, “[y]ester-
day’s opinion flies in the face of the rule of law in our country. It
is a dangerous precedent, indeed, to blatantly cite foreign laws
when interpreting the original meaning of the United States
Constitution. The opinions of foreign governments have no place
in interpreting the original meaning of the Constitution, and it is
high time that these justices be reminded that their duty is to
interpret the Constitution, not to impose the will of foreign enti-
ties on the people of the United States.”
In the two weeks following the Simmons decision, two very
troubling pieces of legislation were introduced in Congress, which
seek to restrict the judicial branch of government from looking to
international cases and legal precedents, even as persuasive author-
ity, in U.S. courts. The first is a non-binding Sense of the Congress
resolution introduced by Congressman Tom Feeney (R-FL) called
the “Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution” (H.R.
97, Feeny Resolution). The second and even more troubling piece
of legislation is the “Constitution Restoration Act.”
The non-binding Feeney Resolution was originally intro-
duced in 2004 to affirm the “Sense of the United States Congress
that judicial decisions should not be based on any foreign laws,
court decisions, or pronouncements of foreign governments unless
they are expressly approved by Congress.” When first introduced,
the human and civil rights communities in the United States took
note of the resolution with limited concern. The general sense was
that it “would go away” and that concerned activists should not
“The tension between the
Supreme Court’s efforts to look
outward and the Executive
Branch’s restrictive interpreta-
tions have resulted in a clash of
perspectives now playing itself
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3
Harris: "We Are the World" - Or Are We? The United States' Conflicting Vi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
aggressively fight this resolution because it would only draw more
attention to it. The resolution, however, did not go away on its
own. It gained more than 50 co-sponsors and passed out of
Committee to be debated by the entire House of Representatives
before the 108th Congress adjourned last year. The Resolution was
reintroduced two weeks after the Simmons decision and is again
gaining momentum. 
Even more troubling, however, is the introduction of the
“Constitution Restoration Act of 2005” (S.520 and H.R.1070),
which is binding legislation and seeks to limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts in certain situations, including prohibiting a court of
the United States from relying upon “any constitution, law, admin-
istrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or
any other action of any foreign state or international organization
or agency, other than English constitutional and common law up
to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States.” The bill further seeks to ban the consideration of any
matters in federal court which are brought against a government
entity, officer, or agent on the basis of “that entity’s officers or
agent’s acknowledgment of God as the sovereign source of law,
liberty, or government.”
Not only does the bill seek to limit courts’ sources of law and
discretion to interpret cases as they see fit, the proposed legislation
goes a step further by determining that if any Supreme Court
Justice or federal court judge “exceeds his or her jurisdictional
limitations” by using those international sources of law, he or she
will be deemed to have committed an impeachable offense and can
be removed from the bench.
Although widely discussed on conservative websites and in
churches, the bill has received little national attention. It would,
however, have a tremendous impact if passed. Such expansive
language could have profound implications in the Court’s ability
to interpret treaty obligations, not only on human rights issues,
but also on issues of international trade, intellectual property, envi-
ronmental issues, and more. 
While the prospect for passage remains unclear, and the con-
stitutionality of such legislation is highly questionable, the very
fact that the legislation has been introduced and has growing
support is troubling. Many believe that this legislation is, as one
prominent activist put it, “a shot across the bow,” warning prospec-
tive judicial nominees (particularly those who may be candidates
for any anticipated openings on the U.S. Supreme Court) that they
must limit their use of international law and foreign court deci-
sions in order to have their appointments confirmed by the Senate.
The ideological battle for the place of international perspectives
and legal obligations continues to rage.
CONCLUSION: 
THE MISGUIDED IMPACT OF FEAR ON DECISION-MAKING
ULTIMATELY, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE USE of foreign and inter-
national law is based on a fundamentally flawed understanding of the
Court’s current decisions and the role which international law and
foreign court decisions have played. As Professor Timothy Wu of the
University of Virginia Law School said, “[these critics] are mixing up
the difference between listening to foreign ideas and obeying foreign
commands.” The Court has never found that foreign law is binding
on the United States. Indeed, the Court has gone to great lengths to
reinforce its belief that the United States has a unique and exception-
al legal history and form of government. 
The United States has historically been a leader in developing
and promoting international standards. The current dispute with-
in the three branches of government over the United States’ com-
mitment to looking outside its borders runs the risk of even more
deeply alienating a world community which has much to offer in
thinking through complex global issues that face us today. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg spoke explicitly about these risks in a recent
address to the American Society of International Law. She said,
“[r]ecognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe we will
continue to accord ‘a decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind,’ [as the drafters of the Declaration of Independence
advised], as a matter of comity and in a spirit of humility.
Comity, because projects vital to our well being—combating inter-
national terrorism is a prime example—require trust and coopera-
tion of nations the world over. And humility because, in Justice
O’Connor’s words, ‘[o]ther legal systems continue to innovate,
to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal
problems that arise each day, from which we can learn and
benefit.’” HRB
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